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Sontag on Impertinent Sympathy and Photographs of Evil 
Sean T. Murphy 
Let the atrocious images haunt us. Even if they are only tokens, and cannot possibly encompass 
most of the reality to which they refer, they still perform a vital function. The images say: This is 
what human beings are capable of doing—may volunteer to do, enthusiastically, self-righteously. 
Don't forget. 
Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others  
1. Introduction  
Although her work is not often discussed in the typical venues for academic philosophy, 
Susan Sontag is likely to be a name that many among our small community would 
recognize. Outside of philosophy her thought has been key to understanding the 
dynamical nature of visual culture throughout the 20th century and its impact on the 
modern human condition. As such, she’s garnered the attention of scholars across 
various fields, from art history to cultural and media studies. Inside philosophy, 
however, one gets the sense that she is treated as a literary aesthete, which might 
explain why philosophers have not paid her work the attention it deserves. This chapter 
attempts to correct for this undeserved neglect by injecting Sontag’s voice into one of 
the most interesting and theoretically complex areas of academic philosophy; namely, 
contemporary metaethics. 
 The text that will be the focus of this essay is Sontag’s late book Regarding the 
Pain of Others (henceforth RPO). The subject matter of the book—the history of 
photographic representations of war—allows for the natural organization of her 
metaethical insights into two rough clusters of views: one deals with issues in moral 
epistemology (specifically moral perception), the other with the moral and epistemic 
value of human sentiments in general, and our sentimental or emotional reactions to 
misery and suffering, in particular. Along the way we will see that her views on these 
matters raise interesting questions about the relationship between aesthetics and 
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ethics. In particular, Sontag raises questions about the moral value of our engagement 
with, and reactions to photographs.  
 With respect to moral epistemology, Sontag holds that we can gain knowledge 
of moral propositions on the basis of perception. What is unique about Sontag’s view 
is that contrary to other moral perception theorists (e.g. Blum 1994), she thinks we can 
directly acquire general moral knowledge via perception, i.e. knowledge of the 
following sort of proposition: “Human beings everywhere do terrible things to each 
other” (Sontag 2003, 116).1 While we can sometimes acquire this kind of general moral 
perceptual knowledge by direct confrontations with reality, it is part of Sontag’s view 
that photographs are particularly well-suited to this purpose.2 I will argue that, for 
Sontag, it is in virtue of their status as aesthetic objects that photographs can serve this 
moral-epistemic purpose.  
We find a clear expression of the second metaethical insight in the following 
passage in RPO, where she discusses our emotional responses to photographs of the 
suffering of war: 
 
So far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the 
suffering. Our sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence. To 
that extent, it can be (for all our good intentions) an impertinent—if not an 
inappropriate—response (Sontag 2003, 102).  
 
This passage raises two problems for any view which gives sympathy or compassion 
pride of place in the foundations of moral value and action. I call these problems The 
Innocence Problem and The Impotence Problem.  
Seeing a photograph of a child covered in napalm might cause me to have a 
certain sentimental reaction, like feeling sympathy or compassion for the child. Those 
                                                   
1 As I will argue, it is important for the uniqueness of Sontag’s view that we are able to acquire 
general moral perceptual knowledge directly, since other moral perception theorists might 
agree with her that we can acquire general moral knowledge via moral perception, but they may 
in turn say that we can only do this indirectly.  
2 In her 2011, Sarah McGrath makes the point that pictures are often thought to be good tools of 
moral conversion on the basis that they can present us with actual instances of whatever moral 
practice it is that we are concerned with, and allow us to draw some “general conclusions in 
response” (McGrath 2011, 268). There is some reason to think that perhaps her view would lend 
itself to the same reading I provide of Sontag here.  
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inclined towards sympathy- or compassion-based approaches to ethics take this to be 
a good thing, some sign of my having the right sorts of values and being in the right 
relation to my fellow human beings. Sontag, however, argues that there are many cases 
where having these sentiments can be both morally and epistemically problematic. She 
thinks that our sentimental responses often presume our innocence and our impotence 
in cases where we in fact are guilty and it is within our power to do something. For 
Sontag, it follows that sometimes the content of our emotional responses is false: it can 
seem that it is part of the content of sympathy that the person who feels sympathetic 
is innocent and impotent, when neither is in fact the case. So while some part of the 
content of our sympathetic response to suffering might be accurate or true, another 
part is not.  
 In the next section I will offer a summary of RPO and provide textual support 
for the two metaethical insights that I attribute to Sontag. Section 3 discusses work on 
moral perception. In section 4 I set Sontag’s views on moral perception and moral 
knowledge against the literature, and argue that she gives us good reason to think that 
we have some general moral perceptual knowledge. Section 5 treats The Innocence 
Problem and The Impotence Problem. I introduce the problems and argue that each 
proves troublesome for some aspects of moral sentimentalism. I then offer some 
additional support for Sontag’s worries in the form of a historical analogue of her view 
found in the work of another 20th century voice neglected by most metaethicists: 
Theodor Adorno. Finally, I consider how the moral sentimentalist might respond.  
 
2. The metaethical and aesthetic insights of Regarding the Pain of Others  
In RPO, Sontag considers the human fascination with depictions of the misery and 
ruin wrought by war. She examines the ways in which violence and cruelty have been 
artistically represented in various media, including painting and film. But her main 
focus is on the practice of war photography that began with the Crimean War, and 
achieved its greatest ethical relevance during the Vietnam War, a moment in history 
when “war photography became, normatively, a criticism of war” (Sontag 2003, 65). She 
also discusses photographic representations of the more recent conflicts in the Balkans 
and the Middle East.  
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Her reflections on these photographs and the historical reality they represent are 
primarily concerned with their ethical and aesthetic value. On the ethical side of things, 
she is concerned with familiar questions about the status of moral knowledge, how that 
knowledge figures in moral motivation, and, relatedly, the moral value of our 
sentimental reactions to the pain and misery of others. One of her guiding questions 
is: “[what] to do with such knowledge that photographs bring of faraway suffering?” 
(Sontag 2003, 99). This is a question she believes we all must ask, and one that becomes 
especially pertinent in a modern condition where images of violence proliferate. The 
status of this knowledge will be discussed later in this chapter. For now, it is important 
that we notice the connection that Sontag draws between knowledge, emotion, and 
action in her discussion of what we, the viewers, are to do with these photographs.  
A fruitful way to consider what Sontag says on this score is to compare RPO with 
her earlier, well-known collection of essays, On Photography. In doing so we notice a 
marked difference in what she says about “the ethical value of an assault by images” 
(Sontag 2003, 117). In her earlier work, Sontag was skeptical about the moral credentials 
of photographs, stating that “[the] ethical content of photographs is fragile” (Sontag 
1977, 21). In the same essay (“In Plato’s Cave”), she touches on the “limit of photographic 
knowledge of the world,” noting that while the knowledge acquired by seeing 
photographs “can goad conscience, it can, finally, never be ethical or political 
knowledge” (Sontag 1977, 24).  
By the time she is writing RPO, however, her skepticism has subsided. She reflects 
on this change in her view in the following passage.  
 
In the first of the six essays in On Photography (1977), I argued that while an event 
known through photographs certainly becomes more real than it would have been 
had one never seen the photographs, after repeated exposure it also becomes less 
real. As much as they create sympathy, I wrote, photographs shrivel sympathy. Is 
this true? I thought it was when I wrote it. I'm not so sure now (Sontag 2003, 105).  
 
Throughout her career she was preoccupied by thoughts about the relationship 
between photographs of the evil acts that human beings commit towards each other 
and the emotions they stir in the viewer. Her initial worry was that a sympathetic or 
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compassionate response to the photographs, while appropriate, was not of much 
practical value. This worry is still present in RPO. “Compassion,” she says “is an unstable 
emotion. It needs to be translated into action, or it withers” (Sontag 2003, 101).  This 
claim is related to the challenge raised against moral sentimentalism. There are a 
certain class of moral emotions—sympathy and compassion in particular—that are 
morally problematic for the reason that (a) their content is false or illusory and (b) they 
do not always motivate agents in the appropriate ways. However, this claim does not 
apply to all moral emotions, nor does Sontag think, as she once did, that being 
inundated with images of war threatens to diminish our moral sensibility and our 
degree of moral receptivity to the pain of others.  
 
People don't become inured to what they are shown—if that's the right way to 
describe what happens—because of the quantity of images dumped on them. It 
is passivity that dulls feeling. The states described as apathy, moral or emotional 
anesthesia, are full of feelings; the feelings are rage and frustration (Sontag 
2003, 102).  
 
Before diving into the details of the metaethical insights contained in RPO, we should 
also note what Sontag says about the aesthetic value of the photographs she is 
interested in, since this will bear on the discussion of moral perception which follows.  
Sontag suggests that war photographs are their own unique sort of aesthetic 
object. Their uniqueness lies in the fact that it can be inappropriate to take up a purely 
aesthetic attitude towards them. They are also the sort of aesthetic object whose nature 
as aesthetic is constituted by a set of properties other than what are thought to be 
classically aesthetic properties. To bring out this second point, Sontag remarks on the 
commonly held belief that “to find beauty in war photographs seems heartless” (Sontag 
2003, 75-6). War photographs, she says, cannot be “too much like art” (Sontag 2003, 
76). Likewise, “a beautiful photograph drains attention from the sobering subject and 
turns it toward the medium itself, thereby compromising the picture’s status as a 
document” (Sontag 2003, 77).  
 The question naturally arises: if it is inappropriate for war photographs to 
appear too much like art, then what makes them aesthetic objects? One answer to this 
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question is that photographs are aesthetic in the sense that they are the result of a 
creative act. Although rather crude, this way of thinking about them would speak to 
one of the reasons we might appreciate seeing a war photograph: we appreciate the feat 
of someone actually capturing that particular moment. This would be a kind of 
aesthetic appreciation of the creative act, and what the photographer did to get 
themselves in the position to pull that act off, rather than an aesthetic appreciation of 
the content of the image. When we focus on the creative act of the photographer, 
however, we come face-to-face with a central question in the aesthetics of photography, 
namely, the question of realism.  
The photographic realist claims that photographs are transparent to the world.3 
When you see a photograph of a screaming child covered in napalm running through 
her village streets, you really see that child in that condition. That is, you see the world, 
and not just a photograph of the world. Sontag is torn between her conviction that 
something like realism must be true, and the idea that every photograph is the result 
of a creative act, an action that occurs at a certain time, in a certain place, from a certain 
perspective. This tension is seen in the following two passages.  
 
Photographs had the advantage of uniting two contradictory features. Their 
credentials of objectivity were inbuilt. Yet they always had, necessarily, a point 
of view. They were a record of the real—incontrovertible, as no verbal account, 
however impartial, could be—since a machine was doing the recording. And 
they bore witness to the real—since a person had been there to take them 
(Sontag 2003, 26). 
 
[The] photographic image, even to the extent that it is a trace (not a 
construction made out of disparate photographic traces), cannot be simply a 
transparency of something that happened. It is always the image that someone 
chose; to photograph is to frame, and to frame is to exclude (Sontag 2003, 46).  
 
                                                   
3 For the classic defense of this view, see Walton 1973.  
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The very thing that renders war photographs objects worthy of some kind of aesthetic 
appreciation equally jeopardizes their epistemic credentials. This problem of 
photographic choice raises the question of the status of any objective knowledge 
acquired through seeing a photograph. As an exegetical matter, we must ask in which 
direction Sontag leans: are photographs objective records ‘of the real’ or is what they 
depict always a reality seen from a particular point of view, and therefore not strictly 
speaking ‘objective’ at all? 
For the time being, I will run with the idea that Sontag, though of a mixed mind, 
is committed to the idea of war photographs as records of the real (even if they are not 
direct transparencies of what they represent). The aesthetic value of such photographs 
is therefore not to be fully accounted for by appealing to the creative act of the 
photographer, nor is it proper to say that what they record has the property of being 
beautiful. Thus, the best candidate for a view of the aesthetic value of documentary war 
photographs takes their aesthetic value to be primarily a matter of their cognitive value. 
A documentary war photograph succeeds aesthetically, that is, succeeds in accordance 
with the kind of aesthetic object that it is, when it presents the viewer with a 
representation of war that can be used to ground beliefs about the world that are 
conducive to knowledge about the world.4  
But what sorts of knowledge about the world do war photographs ground? 
Sontag’s answer is that the most significant kind of knowledge we get from looking at 
war photographs is moral knowledge—and not just any kind of moral knowledge, but 
knowledge of general moral propositions such as “human beings everywhere do terrible 
things to one another” (Sontag 2003, 116). This suggests that Sontag’s settled view is 
that the aesthetic value of war photographs is exhausted by the extent to which they 
add to the viewer’s reservoir of moral knowledge. In doing so, they provide the 
cognitive benefit of helping agents reach what she calls “moral and psychological 
adulthood” (Sontag 2003, 114). I will have more to say about how their status as aesthetic 
objects contributes to these epistemic and moral gains. But first we must consider 
                                                   
4 The problem of the frame implies that photographs are always more than just direct 
representations. It would be an overly simplistic view of Sontag’s many reflections to say that 
she subscribes wholeheartedly to photographic realism. Moreover, it is precisely because 
photographs are aesthetic objects that they can do more than just directly represent. Thanks to 
Michael A. Rosenthal for reminding me to appreciate the many complexities in Sontag’s views.  
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Sontag’s claim that we can acquire knowledge of general moral propositions by seeing 
photographs. To do this, we need to examine her view of moral perception.  
 
3. Moral perception and moral knowledge  
For what follows, it will help to review some of the general features of moral perception 
theory. Let us assume that a lot of what gets photographed during war and smaller 
conflict are states of affairs that morally ought not to be. Setting aside metaphysical 
questions about the nature of moral values (real? anti-real? irreal?), let us focus on the 
epistemological question of how we know that what these photographs show is a reality 
that morally ought not to be. In virtue of what can we be confident that utterances of 
this sort are true? 
Moral epistemology addresses questions about how we come to know what is 
morally good and bad, what morally ought and ought not to be, or what we morally 
ought and ought not to do. To chop things rather roughly, philosophers will usually 
offer either a rationalist or an empiricist moral epistemology.5 The rationalist can claim 
that we come to know the morally good and bad through a priori reasoning, innately, 
or because what is morally good and bad is self-evident, something we know via 
intuition. The empiricist, on the other hand, holds that moral knowledge is a species 
of empirical knowledge. Since empirical knowledge is the sort of thing we typically 
acquire via perception, one kind of empiricist claims that we have perceptual moral 
knowledge. Sontag’s remarks in RPO align her more closely with the empiricist.  
The literature on moral perception has been steadily growing over the last 
several years (Blum 1994; McGrath 2004; Wright 2007; Cullison 2009; Dancy 2010; 
McBrayer 2010; Audi 2013. For a skeptical view see Väyrynen 2018). Those who are 
attracted to the idea of moral perception believe, as Jen Cole Wright puts it, “that there 
are genuine perceptual states that have moral (or morally relevant) content” (Wright 
2007, 2). If this can be shown, then it is plausible to think that at least some moral 
knowledge can be had by way of perception. Furthermore, if the view succeeds, then 
our perceptual experiences can be cited as evidence for some of our moral beliefs. “How 
                                                   
5 Here I am following the way McBrayer 2010 frames the issues.  
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do you know that what those soldiers did is morally bad, Susan?” Answer: “because I 
see that it is.”6  
 Moral perception, its proponents argue, is analogous to ordinary perception in 
many respects. We have no trouble claiming that we can have perceptual knowledge, 
under good conditions, of the objects in front of us in ordinary experience. I see the 
mug on the counter. So, the mug is part of the perceptual content of my experience, 
from which I conclude that there is a mug on the counter, and therefore that the 
proposition “the mug is on the counter” is true.  
Likewise, moral perception theorists claim that the perceptual states we are in 
when we see pickpocketing on the subway, wrongful exploitation in the workplace, etc. 
have the “wrongness” of the act or “badness” of that state of affairs as part of its content. 
This is so even if it is the case, as some suggest, that the wrongness or badness we 
perceive is grounded in the ordinary, non-moral empirical data that makes up the 
content of the perceptual state.7 Having moral perception of your bosses exploitative 
behavior will likely require having the ordinary perception of, for example, seeing him 
make marks on a page: perhaps he crosses out your colleagues over-time hours because 
he does not want to pay them over-time. Even if the perceptual state you are in has a 
mixed content, the moral perception theorist holds that part of that content is moral.8  
Before turning to Sontag, consider some perceptual states with moral content: 
 
(1) Perceiving that that particular act of pickpocketing is wrong 
(2) Perceiving your boss’s exploitative behavior as despicable 
(3) Perceiving that human beings are capable of unspeakable wrongdoing 
(4) Perceiving the world as a bad place 
                                                   
6 This way of thinking about things presupposes that seeing that p entails that one knows that 
p. (For a discussion of this thesis see Pritchard 2012).   
7 See Audi 2013, 38-9.  
8 But again for doubts about moral perception see Väyrynen 2018. Väyrynen claims that 
“[positing] distinctively perceptual representations of moral properties would add no 
explanatory power because a simpler and a more unified account treats their representations in 
the relevant cases as resulting instead from implicit transitions in thought,” (Väyrynen 2018, 
110). But note that many moral perception theorists, Wright included, do not take themselves 
to be committed to claiming that we have perception of moral properties. Rather, their claim is 
that moral perception is a kind of aspect or factive perception, not property/trope perception 




Moral perception theorists often focus on examples like (1) and (2).  In such cases, the 
content of the perceptual state of the agent concerns a particular moral wrong. With 
the literature focused on these sorts of cases, two fairly widespread ideas emerge. First, 
that moral perception is a skill, something that is possessed by mature moral agents, 
and second, that moral perception always concerns some particular person’s needs.9  
Mature moral agents can achieve knowledge of the wrongness of (1) and (2) 
above through a combination of perceiving what takes place and attending to the 
particular good of the person(s) involved. It is in virtue of the fact that the good of a 
particular individual is made salient to the mature moral agent in combination with 
the non-moral facts that the content of their perception has a moral element. Hence, 
Lawrence Blum claims that “one of the most important moral differences between 
people is between those who miss and those who see various moral features of 
situations confronting them” (Blum 1994, 30). Mature moral agents, for Blum, are those 
who are perceptually sensitive of the needs of others, which enables them to know 
when they are in a situation where something must be done in support of another’s 
needs—they are the sorts of people who are skilled at perceiving “moral situations as 
moral situations” (Ibid.) 
 Moral perception theorists like Blum often object to universalist or impartialist 
ethical theories that explain the morality of an agent’s action in terms of her 
recognizing the moral rule that applies to her situation. According to such a theory, a 
moral agent is said to be responsive to the needs of others in a particular case in virtue 
of there being some general rule which she endorses that says she ought, in such cases, 
to act in certain ways. As a moral particularist, Blum disagrees with this approach to 
the morality of action. He argues instead that in order to act in a way that is distinctively 
moral, the agent must act “from loving attention to particular persons” (Blum 1994, 25). 
Even if we grant that an agent might be skilled at “perceiving moral situations as moral 
situations,” and that her principles may reinforce perception of this type, she cannot be 
said to have particular moral knowledge—moral knowledge of the sort that Blum 
                                                   
9 This point is emphasized by Blum (1994), and Wright (2007) follows his lead on this matter. 
Wright, drawing on empirical research into the nature of “refined perception,” defends the view 
that moral perception is only available to moral agents whose perceptual apparatus is refined.  
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thinks is crucial for loving moral action—if the content of her perceptual state is 
something general like in states (3) and (4) above.  
 Sontag, however, is not committed to tying moral perception to moral 
particularity, nor does she hold that the value of moral perception is ultimately a matter 
of its enhancing our epistemic sensitivity to particular instances of evil. Thus, whereas 
Blum and others focus on examples of moral perception like (1) and (2) above, Sontag 
is more interested in examples like (3) and (4). When she asks “[what] to do with such 
knowledge that photographs bring of faraway suffering?” I suggest that we should read 
her as speaking about general, as opposed to particular, moral knowledge (Sontag 2003, 
99). The Sontagian claim about moral perception that I will defend below is that, in 
addition to providing us with knowledge of particular moral propositions about the 
goods and needs of others, perception provides direct knowledge of general moral 
propositions as well. Contrary to Blum and others Sontag believes there is moral value 
in perceiving something general about humans in the particular, and, moreover, this 
kind of perception does not do violence to particularity.  
 
4. Perceptual Knowledge of General Moral Truths?   
In the cases like (1) and (2) above, there is some particular action or state of affairs that 
an agent perceives, and part of the content of her perception is that the particular 
action or state of affairs is wrong or despicable. But in cases like (3) and (4), the 
perceptual content is different: what the agent perceives is not something particular, 
but rather something general in the particular. This straightaway raises a question 
about whether or not there is some inference involved in cases like (3) and (4) such 
that the general moral knowledge in those cases is not perceptual, but rather 
inferential. And there is the additional worry of whether such inferences, if they are 
involved, would be justified, since while some inferences to the general are quite safe, 
others may not be.  
The aim of the following section is to present Sontag’s argument for the claim 
that general moral knowledge can be had by way of perception, and therefore that some 
perceptual states have as part of their content some general, rather than particular 
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moral truths.10 I will also show how she addresses the aforementioned worries about 
the role inference plays in our acquisitions of moral perceptual knowledge.  
  The first thing to note is that Sontag does not enter the debate about moral 
perception at the earliest stage of trying to convince a skeptic that there is such a thing 
as moral perception.11 Rather, she is speaking to those who are already inclined to 
believe that there is such a capacity. Her main argument for the claim that we can have 
general moral perceptual knowledge appears in her discussion of how war photographs 
weigh on memory.  
She begins by pointing out that “[there] is simply too much injustice in the 
world. And too much remembering (of ancient grievances: Serbs, Irish) embitters.” 
(Sontag 2003, 115). Her thought is that there is ethical value in forgetting, since were 
one to never forget past injustices, it would be difficult to go on living. Less 
dramatically, if one cannot forget the wrongs done to them by others, then their 
relations will never recover the form they once had. The point is that there is some 
good to be had for the Irishmen, whether Protestant or Catholic, who strive to forget 
what the other side did during The Troubles.  
Sontag thus believes that those afflicted by political violence should move 
beyond the particular harms done to them as best they can and let their desires for 
retribution subside. “If the goal is having some space in which to live one’s life,” she 
says, “then it is desirable that the account of specific injustices dissolve into a more 
general understanding that human beings everywhere do terrible things to one 
another” (Sontag 2003, 115-6). This is a normative recommendation about how one 
ought to go on living after directly experiencing political violence. For many, such a 
recommendation is already morally problematic. Whether or not Sontag is right to 
make such a recommendation, I am interested in the epistemic implications of what 
she says, since these implications bear on the question of moral knowledge.  
                                                   
10 In this way, I see Sontag’s work on moral perception to be loosely Moorean in spirit, since she 
is claiming that knowledge can be legitimately had directly via perception. In a sense, Sontag at 
times even seems to be offering something analogous to a Moorean proof. How do I know 
suffering is bad? Here is a picture of it. See Moore 2000.  
11Wright has the following nice response to such a person: “[Mature] moral agents do not possess 
some distinct [‘moral sense’]: their existing faculties of perception have simply been refined and 
developed in such a way as to enables them to reliably perceive subtle facts about the moral 




One such implication is that specific injustices often reveal something general 
about human beings and the human world. According to Sontag, we ought to “[let] 
these atrocious images” of injustice haunt us (Sontag 2003, 115). “The images says: this 
is what human beings are capable of doing—may volunteer to do, enthusiastically, self-
righteously” (Ibid).12  Notice the two propositions Sontag gives us to work with here. 
We can explicitly quote the first as “human beings everywhere do terrible things to one 
another” (Ibid). The second proposition adds to the first the idea that human beings 
do these terrible things voluntarily, and so reads as follows: “human beings everywhere 
voluntarily do terrible things to each other.” The idea here is unique not only because 
of the form of the moral propositions Sontag has in mind, but also because of the way 
in which she thinks it is possible for us to acquire knowledge of them, namely, 
perceptually. Two comments about her claim are called for.  
First, in the above passage, Sontag speaks about the way humans can come to 
have a “general understanding” of the above two propositions. That is, she is talking 
about ways we can come to understand general moral truths by perceiving war 
photographs, but not explicitly about whether or not this perception gives us 
knowledge. Depending on how one draws the line between perceptual moral 
understanding and perceptual moral knowledge, this claim will be more or less striking, 
perhaps because understanding is epistemically weaker than knowledge. So where does 
Sontag draw the line between the two? I think it is clear from the surrounding context 
in which this claim occurs that she does think that the general understanding that she 
thinks mature moral agents come to have by seeing war photographs is a result of the 
general moral knowledge that the photographs transmit perceptually. Thus, what is 
really needed is a defense of the claim that we can have some general moral knowledge 
by perceiving war photographs. If we can have that, then we will be in a position to 
fulfill the normative recommendation to forget.  
War photographs, according to Sontag, enlarge “our sense of how much 
suffering caused by human wickedness there is in the world we share with others” 
(Sontag 2003, 114). They perform this task by showing “what human beings are capable 
                                                   
12 Shortly after saying this, Sontag tells us not to forget what these photographs show, but then 
goes on to say that there is some ethical value in forgetting. I am not going to guess where she 
comes down on this complicated issue.  
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of inflicting in the way of gruesome, hands-on cruelties upon other human beings” 
(Ibid). But what about an example of ordinary moral perception? Sontag’s claim is that 
the relevant perceptual states often admit of a particular and a general interpretation. 
The particular interpretation is the one given to them by Blum and others. But Sontag 
wishes to claim that the very same ordinary perceptual states can be interpreted as 
providing agents with moral knowledge of a more general sort in virtue of the same 
content that Blum and others would cite as providing agents with particular moral 
knowledge. However, there might be some reasons to doubt that this is true.  
As an example, imagine that you were one of the many war photographers sent 
to document the Vietnam War. To make things even more vivid, imagine you are 
standing next to Ron Haeberle in the village My Lai in March of 1968. You are taking 
photographs of the massacre that occurred shortly before you arrived. As far as 
standard moral perception theory goes, you are in a perceptual state with moral 
content, which can put you in a position to know an empirical moral truth about the 
world, namely, that what the marines did to these villagers was wrong (wrong in 
general, wrong in accordance with the rules of war, etc.).13 The idea is that by being in 
that perceptual state you can also acquire knowledge of a more general empirical moral 
truth about the world, namely, “that human beings do terrible things to each other” or 
“that great human suffering is caused by great human wickedness.” And this shows that 
the perceptual state has general as well we particular contents. 
 However, here one might worry that the perceptual state one is in has only 
particular contents, and that the move to the general requires an inference. This is 
problematic for Sontag, since her claim is that we can have general moral perceptual 
knowledge, not just general moral knowledge that we infer on the basis of some 
particular moral perceptual knowledge. Moreover, the inference here is potentially 
unjustified: it would be too quick to assume that people everywhere do wrongful things 
to each other just by seeing a handful of bad (even atrocious) actions. But all that these 
worries show is that it is not mere happenstance that Sontag chooses to talk about 
general moral perceptual knowledge had by looking at photographs, rather than 
                                                   
13 Even with the evaluative context altered as it is during times of war.  
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through direct perception of the world. It is the uniqueness of photographic perception 
that forms the basis of her argument. 
One of Sontag’s main claims is that the ethical value of photographs rests in the 
fact that they can provide unique opportunities for moral perception that one might 
otherwise not have. While perceiving such photographs cannot remedy all of the holes 
in our moral knowledge, they at least present us with “an invitation to pay attention, 
to reflect, to learn, [and] to examine the rationalizations for mass suffering […]” (Sontag 
2003, 117). Paying attention to, reflecting on, learning about, and examining are 
activities through which we can acquire certain epistemic goods that enable us to reach 
moral maturity. As long as such holes exist in one’s moral knowledge, then, as Sontag 
says, they will not have “reached moral or psychological adulthood” (Sontag 2003, 114). 
The implication is that in order to reach moral adulthood one must possess moral 
knowledge of not only particular moral wrongs, but of general moral wrongs as well.  
And one of the ways to justifiably achieve this knowledge is by studying the 
photographic record.  
 As it turns out, war photographs are particularly well-suited for providing the 
sort of general moral knowledge Sontag is interested in, and thus they meet the worries 
about justification mentioned above. This is in virtue of their being aesthetic objects.  I 
already argued above that the aesthetic value of documentary war photographs can be 
thought of as being a matter of the cognitive benefits such photographs provide. Now 
we see that one of those cognitive benefits is that they provide general moral knowledge 
of human evil and wickedness. This adds to our thinking about their aesthetic value 
the idea that documentary photographs succeed aesthetically to the extent that they 
provide opportunities for epistemic (and also moral) enrichment. 
 It is because war photographs are aesthetic objects that they can provide these 
sorts of cognitive benefits. According to at least some aesthetic theories, such as Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s, an aesthetic object, like a photograph, provide epistemic 
opportunities that are unavailable in other parts of life.  This is because aesthetic 
objects provide their audience with an opportunity to contemplate general, as opposed 
to particular, ideas. We might refer to this as the capacity of aesthetic objects to make 
certain ideas salient to us. As the argument goes, aesthetic contemplation provides a 
focused form of contemplation, one removed from ordinary human concerns. This 
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allows the audience to contemplate certain general ideas that they may miss in ordinary 
life. 14 
 Applied to Sontag, the idea is that war photographs can make the truth of 
certain general moral propositions salient to us, and especially to those of us prone to 
a false moral optimism. They do this in virtue of the fact that, as aesthetic objects, they 
are suited to presenting general ideas, things like the idea of the world as a terrible 
place. This nicely avoids an objection that has been lingering about our discussion of 
Sontag’s views on moral perception, which says that general moral perceptual 
knowledge is in fact not perceptual knowledge at all, but inferential knowledge. I think 
this objection has some legs when applied to ordinary moral perception. Maybe it is 
true that in a direct case of moral perception, one is not justified in claiming to have 
seen that some general moral proposition is true. However, war photographs can block 
this move, since they have certain features that make them ripe to convey this sort of 
knowledge directly, namely, they express general ideas.  
My construal of the aesthetic and epistemic value of war photographs also 
blocks another familiar objection to cognitivist views of the arts. Jerome Stolnitz (1992) 
famously argued that the knowledge conveyed by works of art is of a trivial sort. 
Anything we can come to know about the world by engaging with a work of art is 
something we could know through some other means. Thus art has no special cognitive 
value. Moreover, as the objection goes, whatever cognitive benefits there are from 
engaging with art will not bear on art’s value as art.15 The objection from triviality 
misses the mark here, since the general moral knowledge had by perceiving 
photographs is precisely not the sort of knowledge we would be justified in saying we 
acquired simply by seeing a few bad things happen in ordinary life. Even if it would be 
possible for one to acquire this sort of general moral knowledge through some non-
aesthetic means, we could still defend the cognitive value of documentary photographs 
in terms of their making certain features of the world morally salient to individuals who 
might not otherwise have the chance to confront them. This, in fact, is what Sontag 
                                                   
14 This, in admittedly too rough an outline, gives the general flavor of Schopenhauer’s views in 
Book III of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer 2010.   
15 Stolnitz 1992, 191.  
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thinks they do. They make moral truths about human evil salient to those privileged 
enough to never have to confront them directly.16  
 
5. Two Problems for Moral Sentimentalism   
Though Sontag aims to make us aware of the epistemic value of war photographs, her 
real concern is with their moral value. Again, the guiding question of RPO is: “What to 
do with such knowledge as photographs bring of faraway suffering?” (Sontag 2003, 99). 
The previous section treated the epistemic part of her question. This section will treat 
its moral or practical part.  
 Throughout RPO, Sontag exercises caution when discussing the actions, 
attitudes, and emotions that our knowledge of suffering prescribes. The modern moral 
sensibility, she says, “regards suffering as something that is a mistake or an accident or 
a crime. Something to be fixed. Something to be refused. Something that makes one 
feel powerless” (Sontag 2003, 99). Suffering can evoke a wide, conflicting range of 
evaluative responses. In regarding it as a mistake or a crime, we evaluate it is bad or 
wrong. In taking it as something to be fixed, we regard it is providing some motivation 
for us to act to alleviate it. And yet, in making us feel powerless, we regard it as 
something that we cannot do anything about. This later evaluation explains how it is 
that our witnessing suffering can become voyeuristic. And so Sontag says that 
“[perhaps] the only people with the right to look at images of suffering […] are those 
who could do something to alleviate it […] or those who could learn from it. The rest of 
us are voyeurs, whether or not we mean to be” (Sontag 2003, 42).17  
Sontag’s remarks on suffering’s voyeuristic allure caution against assuming that 
other people’s suffering prescribes a unitary response, while also questioning the 
practical value of the moral emotions that witnessing suffering often evokes. In this 
                                                   
16 More needs to be said here to show whether photographs are uniquely suited to provide this 
kind of moral perceptual knowledge, since at first glance it seems a historical painting ought to 
as well.  
17 Here Sontag suggests that moral perception theorists should consider the issue of when a 
moral subject is entitled to certain moral perceptual states, and when she is not. The notion of 
perceptual entitlements that typically gets discussed in literature on perception is usually tied 
to an epistemic notion of justification, whereas here Sontag seems to be speaking about a notion 
of moral justification and its relation to perception.  
18 
 
section I will draw out the implications of these ideas for the metaethical theory they 
most directly effect, namely, moral sentimentalism.  
In a recent volume on moral sentimentalism, Remy Debes and Karsten R. 
Stueber state that moral sentimentalists “are unified by a conviction in the ‘response-
invoking’ nature of (at least some) ethical concepts or judgments; that is, the thesis that 
(at least some) ethical concepts or judgments must be analyzed in terms of human 
emotional responses (broadly construed)” (Debes and Stueber 2017, 1). For example, 
according to some moral sentimentalists, the basis for judging that an action is ‘wrong’ 
is a feeling of disapproval towards that action. Rather than linger over the moral 
sentimentalist’s account of moral judgment, however, I want to examine more closely 
the value they attribute to certain moral emotions, particularly those evoked in 
response to human suffering.  
The moral sentimentalist’s list of favorite moral emotions18 runs long, but we 
can be sure that somewhere on that list will fall a variety of explicitly other-regarding 
emotions like sympathy, empathy, and compassion. These emotions are evoked by 
witnessing another human being’s suffering, and many moral sentimentalists think 
that human beings who feel sympathy, compassion, and empathy for another’s 
suffering are morally good in at least some respects. I will focus on sympathy and 
compassion here, since Sontag refers to them in discussing the practical value of war 
photographs.  
Sontag’s most striking remarks about sympathy occur in the following passage, 
already quoted in section 2:  
 
So far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the 
suffering. Our sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence. To 
that extent, it can be (for all our good intentions) an impertinent—if not an 
inappropriate—response (Sontag 2003, 102).  
 
The main problem that Sontag brings to the moral sentimentalist’s attention here is 
one of content. Emotions like sympathy and compassion purport to have the subject’s 
                                                   
18 I will use the terms moral emotions and moral sentiments interchangeably.    
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innocence and impotence as part of their content when, in fact, in some important 
cases, this is not the case. Since this problem concerns both a subject’s false innocence 
and her false impotence, I will break the problem into two parts: The Innocence Problem 
and The Impotence Problem.  
The Innocence Problem for moral sentimentalism says that certain other-
regrading moral sentiments, in this case sympathy, can be problematic for the reason 
that they include the innocence of the agent experiencing them as part of their content. 
But in many cases, the agent who feels sympathy is in fact not innocent. Therefore, in 
certain cases, the content of sympathy is false or illusory. If Sontag’s view is correct, 
this might seriously jeopardize both the moral and epistemic value of certain other-
regarding emotions. Let us explore the details of her claim.  
The “content” of an emotion would seem to be that which the emotion is about 
or that which it is directed at.19 An emotion like sympathy typically has another 
person’s suffering (or maybe we want to say their good) as part of its content. One 
might claim that since emotions have content, they are a kind of quasi-judgment. One’s 
feeling fear, for example, can be understood as proclaiming something about their 
environment: that something threatening might be lurking around the corner. 
Similarly, one’s feeling sympathy proclaims something about one’s environment, 
namely, that someone is suffering. The passage above, however, shows that Sontag’s 
idea is that sympathy does not just proclaim something about the object which it is 
directed at, but also something about the subject who feels it. By contrast, the standard 
view in moral sentimentalism is that emotional responses are primarily or exclusively 
object-directed.  
Famously, some non-cognitivist moral sentimentalists have used the language 
of ‘projection’ in arguing that our emotional responses project certain properties onto 
natural objects. It is in virtue of these projections that natural objects then acquire their 
                                                   
19 This is just a stab. I am not deeply committed to a cognitive theory of the emotions. More to 
the point, Sontag’s criticisms here would apply to anyone who gave a central role in moral life 
to certain moral emotions, regardless of their subsequent account of the content (or lack 
thereof) of the emotions. If one wishes to claim that emotions have no content, then her 
criticism can just move on down the line and focus on the normative issue of the 
inappropriateness of certain emotions in certain situations, regardless of their contents.  
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emotional or moral significance for us.20 Applied to moral agents, the idea is that if we 
notice someone in distress, we might feel sympathetically towards them, and from that 
feeling we might find ourselves judging that their situation ought not to be, and that 
we should do something to help. As of yet, there does not seem to be anything false in 
the content of one’s sympathy. However, this is because we have not yet taken into 
account what our sympathetic feeling says about us. And this is where Sontag’s remarks 
prove insightful.  
To get a sense for Sontag’s insight, imagine a situation where, walking down the 
street, you see a cyclist crash and injure herself. You feel sympathy for her. What is the 
content of this feeling? Part of it is the suffering of the cyclist. But the full moral weight 
of the feeling cannot be assessed by attending only to its intentional object. So we have 
to ask what your sympathy says (or does not say) about you. One obvious thing it says 
is that you are averse to what happened to the cyclist. It might also say that you ought 
to help. Finally, what will not be part of the content of your sympathy is that you are 
guilty, and you might come to know this by asking yourself if you had anything to do 
with what just happened, to which you answer “no.” So there is nothing morally 
problematic in this case; therefore the content of your sympathy is neither false nor 
illusory.  
But now imagine you are browsing the internet and you come upon a 
photograph documenting an atrocity of war (the My Lai massacre, a young Serbian 
soldier kicking a dying Bosnian woman, a victim of the Rwandan genocide, and so on). 
You feel sympathy for these human beings, or even better, perhaps you feel compassion 
for them. Again, part of the content of this feeling is their suffering, since that is what 
the feeling is directed at. But feelings are not just intentional, but reflexive. And if you 
were to ask yourself whether or not you are in anyway implicated in what you see, 
depending on the context, you may very well be. But then while your sympathy 
                                                   
20 While it is by no means clear whether Hume himself was a projectivist of this sort, his remark 
in the final paragraph of the first Appendix (‘Concerning Moral Sentiment’) to An Enquiry 
concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume 1975 has been influential among moral 
sentimentalists, whether of a Humean or some other stripe. There, he says that “taste,” which 
he appears to view as synonymous with sentiment, “has a productive faculty… gilding or staining 
all natural objects.”  
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proclaims that you had nothing to do with what you see, this is false. Therefore, as 
Sontag sees it, feeling sympathy is impertinent and inappropriate.  
You can be innocent only if you are not an accomplice to what caused the 
suffering. Are you? Sontag implies that if you were directly involved in bringing to 
power the regime that is responsible for the suffering you witness, then you are an 
accomplice, and therefore not innocent. However, even if you were not directly 
involved in bringing that regime to power, you might remain a citizen of the country 
(United States, Serbia, and Rwanda) in which the incidents took, and perhaps continue 
to take place. Or, more likely, you are a citizen of a country who in some way, shape, 
or form supports the regime responsible for the atrocity you witness.  
For Sontag, your being in such a relation to the suffering you perceive follows 
from the fact that, in an increasingly globalized world, “our privileges are located on 
the same map as their suffering—and may, in ways we’d prefer not to imagine—be 
linked to their suffering” (Sontag 2003, 102-3).21 Part of the content of your sympathy, 
therefore, is false or illusory in virtue of what it proclaims about you. Sontag is not 
claiming that it always inappropriate to feel emotions like sympathy. Rather, she is 
claiming that it is inappropriate to feel them in certain important cases, for instance, 
when members of the privileged class of society witness the atrocities committed by 
their country. She thus gives us distinctive reasons to doubt the moral and epistemic 
significance of moral emotions like sympathy and compassion.  
One final piece of evidence we might cite for Sontag’s views is the fact that, as 
she says, “morally alert photographers and ideologues of photography have become 
increasingly concerned with the issues of exploitation of sentiment (pity, compassion, 
indignation) in war photography and of rote ways of provoking feeling” (Sontag 2003, 
80). The fact that these sentiments can be exploited in ways that may be neither 
prudent nor morally efficacious is partially explained by The Innocence Problem. A 
photograph has failed its moral purpose if it arouses emotions with false or illusory 
content.  
                                                   
21 Sontag mostly focuses on incidents perpetrated by the Western powers. I certainly am not 
suggesting that a country that is a victim of Colonialism, the effects of which could perhaps be 
cited in explaining what led to genocide, is afforded the Western privileges that Sontag speaks 
of in this passage.  
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 What about what I am calling The Impotence Problem for moral 
sentimentalism? Here the claim is that the content of certain emotions is false not just 
in virtue of their professing an agent’s innocence, but also in virtue of professing her 
impotence. In some cases, then, it is part of the content of sympathy or compassion 
that the one who feels it is powerless; they are incapable of doing anything about it.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a similar criticism was raised against sentiment-based 
ethics by another fierce social critic, and one whose voice has equally been neglected 
by contemporary metaethics: Theodor Adorno.22 In the spring and summer of 1963, 
Adorno delivered a series of lectures on the problems of moral philosophy. In the final 
lecture of that series, Adorno offers the following criticism of Schopenhauer’s ethics of 
compassion, which carries over to other forms of moral sentimentalism.  
 
[The] concept of compassion tacitly maintains and gives its sanction to the 
negative condition of powerlessness in which the object of our pity finds 
himself. The idea of compassion contains nothing about changing the 
circumstances that give rise to the need for it […]. We may conclude from this 
that the pity you express for someone always contains an element of injustice 
towards that person; he experiences not just our pity but also the impotence 
and the specious character of the compassionate act (Adorno 2001, 173-4).  
 
Adorno’s claim that the feeling of compassion “contains nothing about changing the 
circumstances that give rise to the need for it” can be read as the claim that compassion 
has as part of its content the idea that the circumstances cannot be altered. In other 
words, his main criticism of compassion is that it merely affirms the social conditions 
in which suffering arises. He then goes on to call the compassionate act itself impotent, 
since it cannot effect any change in the world.  
Sontag and Adorno thus agree that, sometimes, it is part of the content of 
sympathy and compassion that nothing can be done. They may also agree on the 
motivational issue of the compassionate act itself being impotent, and being 
                                                   
22 Freyenhagen 2013 is an exception: an excellent study of Adorno’s normative and metaethical 
views that does a nice job of linking some of his ideas to certain contemporary stances in the 
literature, e.g. Aristotelian naturalism, Kantian metaethics, etc.  
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inappropriate for that reason. Sontag, however, seems less sure of this than Adorno. 
She seems to think that compassionate acts are not always impotent. The important 
thing is simply that agents must act on their compassion, before it “withers” (Sontag 
2003, 101).  
The main upshot of these criticisms for the moral sentimentalist is that the 
content of the emotional responses they take to be central for morality has to be treated 
with more subtlety and care. This means appreciating what certain emotions say about 
the person who has them as much as appreciating what they say about others. If the 
basis of our moral judgments and convictions is to be sought in our emotional 
responses, and some of these emotional responses contain false or illusory content 
about the subject, then they will have to be further scrutinized if they are to have the 
value the moral sentimentalist assigns to them. In other words, she must appreciate 
the reflexive, and not just the reactive element of sympathy and compassion.  
Sontag is not denying that it is a morally good thing to react to another’s 
suffering by feeling sympathy or compassion for them. Indeed, such feelings often 
naturally motivate agents to act in ways that will contribute to alleviating that suffering. 
Her point is that taking these emotional responses to be all-things-considered good is 
inconsistent with the troubling human tendency to (a) do nothing about that for which 
they feel sympathy, and (b) to read off of one’s sympathy one’s own moral virtue, and 
their moral exculpation from whatever it is that demanded that emotional response.  
  A moral sentimentalist might respond to The Impotence Problem by claiming 
that Sontag is not operating with the right conception of the relevant moral emotions. 
Sympathy and compassion, they argue, are conceptually tied to motivation. Michael 
Slote makes almost exactly this point in a recent paper (Slote 2017). Sympathy and 
compassion, or as Slote prefers to talk about, empathy, must include as its intentional 
object “the other person’s feeling(s) or emotion(s)” (Slote 2017, 8). But if an agent is 
relating empathically to another’s distress, then they in fact feel distressed too. 
Therefore, “one ipso facto has some motivation to do away with or lesson” the other’s 
pain (Ibid). It is available to Slote and others to argue that in order to be in an emotional 
state like sympathy or empathy, that state must have the right motivational contents. 
Impotence, naturally, is not the right motivational contents. So Sontag is not even 
talking about the sorts of emotions that the moral sentimentalist is interested in.   
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 The Innocence Problem proves more difficult for the moral sentimentalist. 
Squabbling over what is and what is not part of the content of a given moral emotion 
does not seem the way to go here. And even if the Impotence Problem can be met by 
noting that certain moral emotions must motivate and bring about changes in 
circumstance to count as the very moral emotion in question, it still could be that such 
emotions profess our innocence. Thus it is in her unveiling of the Innocence Problem 
that Sontag exhibits her genuine utility for contemporary metaethics.  
What this shows is that metaethicists and moral philosophers interested in the 
moral emotions have not paid sufficient attention to their reflexive character, that is, 
what the emotions say about the subject who feels them, and the interesting issues it 
raises. One research area that might directly benefit by engaging with Sontag’s views is 
work on the reactive attitudes, those attitudes which, as Michelle Mason has recently 
put it, “respond to the wrong and the bad in human action and character” (Mason 2017, 
153).  
The reactive attitude theorist is interested in showing that attitudes like 
resentment, holding one in contempt, guilt, etc. have a serious role to play in moral 
life. But in doing so, it is often taken for granted that, for instance, the value of one’s 
attitude of contentment towards another’s action or character is cashed out purely in 
terms of the appropriateness of the reaction. Feeling contempt is taken to count in 
favor of a negative evaluation of the actions or character of another. But what the 
reactive attitude theorist ignores is what this response says or reflects about the agent 
who has it. Sontag’s general lesson, I think, is that we need to ask what such reactions 
say about ourselves. Just as it can be morally problematic to continue to feel innocent 
in the face of suffering, so it can be morally problematic to allow one’s emotional 
reactions to pass as unreflective signals of the moral truth.23   
  
                                                   
23 I would like to thank my fellow presenters at the 2018 Lost Voices at the Foundations of Ethics 
conference held at the University of Washington, Seattle, first for their congeniality, and second 
for their helpful comments and probing objections to an earlier version of this essay. Special 
thanks to Colin Marshall for his generous (and plentiful) comments on several drafts of this 
essay. I’d also like to thank Dave Fisher, Kevin Mills, Sandy Shapshay, Ivan Verano, and Allen 
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